Abstract: Each day, a countless number of items is sold through online auct ion sites such as eBay and Ricardo. Though abuse is being reported more and more, transactions seem to be relatively hassle free. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is t hat the sites' reputation mechanisms prevent opportunistic behavior. To analyze this issue, w e first summarize and extend the mechanisms that affect the probability of sale of an item and its price. We then try to replicate the results as found in four recent papers on online auctions. Our analyses reveal that (1) it makes sense to differentiate between 'power sellers' and the less regular users, (2) there are variables that have an effect on sales that are often not controlled for, (3) one should ca refully consider how reputation is operationalized, ( 4) neglecting heteroscedastidty in the data can have serious consequences, and (5) there is some support indica ting that effect s differ across auction sites.
1. lntroduction
Trust and Online Auctions
Thousands of individuals sell and purchase items from one a n oth er on t he Intern et. These p eople m eet each other on virtual m a rket places or auction sites, su ch as eBay.com , ePie r. com, or qxl. co.uk. Chancesare that you are on e of t h em, bu t in case you do not know how it works, the procedure roughly runs as follows : seller s promot e goods they want to sell by giving a p roduct descr ipt ion on an auction site. Buyers can comp ete with each other through an auction system to purchase the promoted product. The w inner pays, usually upfront, the mon ey to the seller and then the seller ships the item. Anybody with access to the inte rnet is a potential seller or buyer on a n a uction site.
An importa nt asp ect of these online C2C markets is tha t consumers can trade w ithout direct physical interaction. In othe r words, consumers can engage in trad e with others wh om they d o n ot m eet. In a way, t h is m eans t h at t h e ma rket gets closer to w h at a 'perfect m arket' is supposed tobe. Unfort unately, this key aspect of online a u ctions is its Achilles' h eel in trading as well. Lack of physical inter action mean s tha t careful checking of products and trading p artners is h ardly p ossib le. Perhaps an even la rger drawb ack is the time lag between purch asing a nd receiv ing goods. At least one party h as to send in his good, either t h e item or the money, wit h ou t strong guarantees of get ting something in return. Nevertheless, some m ajor online a uction sites are quite su ccessful. For instance, in 2001 eBay.com counted 29.4 million registered users (van Swol 2001) , while in 2003 eBay claimed to have 12 million items on sale in 18,000 categories on any given day. How can this be? To analyze this situation, previous resea r chers (e.g. Ba/Pavlou 2002; Diekmann/ Wyder 2002) have already mentioned the obvious underlying trust issue. A buyer places trust by bidding on an auctioned item, whereas a seller may honor trust by shipping the auctioned item, or may abuse trust by either shipping an item of lower quality than advertised, or b y n ot shipping the item at all (we disregard the related but smaller t rust issues on the seller's side, such as buyers who win an auction but do not pay) .
Information often plays an important role in trust problems. In online auctions, two questions are typically of interest to the buyer. Can I trust this buyer? and Can I trust this item? If a buyer is uncertain enough about either one-the buyer's intentions or the product's quality-a potentially m ut ually pr ofitable sale may not materialize (Akerlof 1970) . Therefore, providing a buyer with information on the quality and value of a product and on the 'kind' of seller one is dealing with may help to decrease the trust problem, as auction sites obviously recogmze.
At least two mechanisms are in place that may provide a seller with such information: through a n extensive product description the seller can try to reduce uncertainty a b out the quality of the good, and a reputation syst em exist s as a measure of the r eliability of the seller. Online auction sites pr ovide a mechanism for their users to evaluate each other. Although n ot all r eputation mechanisms are alike, all do provide information on a seller's p ast behavior on the auction site. For instance, after a completed auction on eBay. com, buyer and seller can (but need not) evaluate each other by 'leaving feedback' about the other party. N egative feedback is represe nted by a score of '-1', ' 0' resembles neutral feedback, while '+1' represents positive feedback. When a user first registers at eBay.com he receives a reputation score of zero. Over time, buyers a nd sellers leaving feedb ack leads to the reputa tion scor e increasing or decreasing according t o the behavior in auctions t h e use r participated in. A more extensive elaboration on eBay's reputation system is available at: http:/ jpages.ebay.com/services/forum/ feedback.html.
Different reputation mechanisms have emerged on different auction sit es. Most, if not all r eputation m echa nisms are at least partly quantitatively based. Every review left by a party results in feedback, and the summation of all points is a person's 'reputation score' or 'feedback rating'. In principle t h e r eputation mechanisms can differ with respect to the kinds of feed back that can b e given: positive, neutral, or negative. eBay's feedback m echanism-at least at the time of the data collection for this paper-allows positive, n egative, and n eutral feedback. The reputation score is calcula ted as the differen ce b etween the numb er of (unique) positive comments and the number of (unique) n egative comments . Except for quantitative comments, most larger auction sites such as eBay a nd QXL allow for small bits of qualitative reputation as well. Seiler and buyer can provide a couple of lines of text regarding the party they dealt wit h. What the reputation mech a nism s h ave in common is that they are all acting as measurements of the trust worthiness of the people participating in t he auction.
Mixed Findings in the Literature
A number of recent papers have considered the effects of reputa tion on sales and the results are typically mixed. In fact, the most St raightfo rwa rd effect one would expect, a positive reputation having a positive effect on both the probability of sale and the price, is not always found. Some researchers eve n come up with highly unexpected effects, such as a negative reputation having a positive effect on an a uction's end price (Eaton 2002; K a uffman/Wood 2000) . Dellarocas (2003) provides the most recently published overview; ma ny working papers on the topic are available from the Reputations Research Network (http:// databases.si. umich.edu/reputations). Lee, Im, and Lee (2000) give three possible reasons for the var iat ion in the results found in previous papers by for example Kauffman and Wood (2000) and Ba and Pavlou (2002) . First, they mention the differen ces in t h e t ypes of products under study. Although they are not very concrete about how t h is might matter, a likely explanationisthat the risk involved in purchasin g an item depends on a number of product cha racteristics, combined with the assumption that a buyer's 'need' to deal with a seller of high reputation differs for d ifferent levels of risk. A buyer's risk is larger for items of larger valu e, so for t h e larger value items r eputation might matter, wh er eas it h as no im p act when one considers item s of smaller value. The n eed for informa tion on a seller 's t r ustworthiness may also de p end on a pro duct's condition. Ba a nd P avlou (2002) believe t h at the fact tha t they did n ot find a ny significant effects for negative reputat ion is b ecause they considered used a nd refurbish ed products, as opposed to on ly n ew products. The probability tha t a n item malfunctions is lower for new products t han for used products, t he risk of purch asing a broken item is t herefor e high er for used products tha n for n ew products . A ccordingly, b uyers may be m ore sensitive to a seller's reputa tion when purch asing a used item.
A simila r a rgument h olds for the com plexity of a p ro duct. A s Buskens m entioned , "complex products leave more opportunities for hidden d efects" (Busken s 1999, 132) . The m ore features a product h as, the mor e feat ures m ight b e m alfunctioning, incr easing a buyer 's risk of purchasing a pr od uc t t h a t is n ot per fec t. Therefor e, buyers ma y h ave greater need for information on t he t r ustwor t h iness of the seller w hen buy ing mor e complex products tha n wh en buying less comp lex products. The second fac tor that might cause mixed resu lts is t h e way t h e ind ep endent variable of reputation is op er a tionalized. Eaton (2002) , for instance, rep orts tha t h e finds n o significa nt effects for n egativ e rep utation u n less n egative reputa tion is b eing d ich otomized. Other research ers log-transform t h e r eput ation scor e, include or exclude the negative comments in t heir m easu rem ent, and so on. Third, the way in w hich da t a was collected could con tribu te t o t he mixed results . W hile som e research ers control for varia bles con cerning pr od uct condition, others control for tra nsaction rela ted variables like shipment costs and means of paym ent, wh ereas still other s cont r ol for hardly any oth er p ossible inte rvening variables. Finally, R esnick, Zeckha user, Swanson, and Lockwood (2002) p oint to the effect s of the differe nt sta tistical metho ds t h at h ave b een used. Most researchers ha ve used OLS regressions; some have used Heck manlike selection models instead.
Research Questions
Tobetter understa nd behavior in online auctions, we employ t he following st rategy. First, we try to systema tize and extend the theory as found in pr evious papers on reputa tion in online a u ctions. We then try t o r eplicate t h e result s of four of those studies using auction data we collected ou rselves. In our d ata we tried to include all of the va riables that were included in pr evious st udies, and added some that we considered of possible interest based on our t heoret ical account. We then test the hypothesized effects using these dat a. The following research questions are a t the core of this study: What is t h e effec t of seller reputation on sales? What is the effect of product d esc ription on sales? W h at other factors affect sales in online auctions? Do effects of r eputation d iffer across auction sites?
The latter question needs some additional explana tion. S in ce m ost research on online reputation has been conducted on eBa y. com, it is wise to think a b out the extent to which r esults are 'eBay-sp ecific'. There are indeed some argume nts that su ggest tha t effects of reputa tion may d iffer acr oss au ction sit es. For insta n ce, one alternative site we conside r is ePier.com. This is a gen er al auction site , largely similar to eBay, but with a different message. ePier. com claims to b e "waiting to set inte rnet free" a nd for this r eason charges n o list ing fees (what you have to pay to list your item) a nd sm alle r final value fees (wh a t you h ave to p ay the a uction site if the ite m is sold). In gen eral, ePier.com tries to crea te a differ ent ide ntity than eBay. com , p ortraying a n image of eBay as t h e big comme rcial a uction site a nd of ePier.com as a 'h app y community ' wh ere on e comes to ex change goods with friends. In such a place, if it exists, a r eputat ion syste m would add no value.
Auctions as Trust Problems
Let us first m a ke the resembla nce b etween auctions a nd t rust issues mor e concrete. Cole ma n (1990) m entions four elements t h a t define trust sit u ations b etween a trustor a nd a trust ee. The first is the fact that p lacin g t rust p rovides a t rust ee wit h resources, t h at he otherwise would not h ave received. T he second elem ent is that a t rustor is better off placing t rust t han not placing trust , p rovided tha t the trust ee is trust worthy. If the trustee on t he oth er hand is n ot t rustworthy, the trustor is wor se off placing t rust tha n wh en n ot p lacing t r ust. Third, Colem a n stresses tha t the p lacement of trust b y a t r ustor is volun tarily a nd w ithout formal safegua rds. F inally, t h ere sh ould be a time lag b et ween a t rustor placing t rust a nd a trust ee h on oring t rust. As on e can easily see, auction sales can b e consider ed a trust pr oble rn according to this definition. Figure 1 sh ows t h e t rust problern b etween seller a n d buyer in onlin e a u ctions (the Trust Game: D asgupta 1988; Kreps 1990) . After a seller h as open ed t h e a uction, a buyer can ch oose t o eithe r place a bid (coopera t e) or n ot (d efect) .
If a buyer chooses to defect, she has no chance of either receiving a potential gain (Rb), nor a potential loss (S). Her payoff is then lower than the potential gain, but higher than the potential loss. A seller will try to encourage a buyer to place trust, because if a buyer defects, the seller will receive the lowest payoff possible: P,. However, if a buyer places trust, she is uncertain whether the seller will honor or abuse trust. The chance of receiving payoff Rb depends on the probability that a seller is trustworthy. Although Rb is the highest possible payoff for a buyer, by cooperating, a buyer runs the risk of receiving the lowest possible payoff S, which means that after a buyer has paid the seller, the seller defects and ships an item of lower quality than advertised or does not ship the item at all.
Basically, if T is !arger than R,, the seller has an incentive to abuse trust.
There can be reasons, however, why abuse by the seller is not rewarding after all, for instance because the seller can anticipate that abuse would Iead to negative feedback on the auction site, which could frustrate future sales. The 'effective T', so to speak, could then be smaller than R,. Though the seller is aware of his effective T, the buyer is uncertain about this value, and can try to infer so mething ab out it, for instance based on the seller's repu tation score. Typically, the buyer is also uncertain about the value of Rb· Again, the buyer can try to decrease this uncertainty before buying. 
Explaining Trust through Seiler Characteristics: Reputation
Although seller characteristics other than reputation could well be of influence on sales and are included in our data collection and analyses (for instance, one could imagine that it helps if a seller has a label 'seller is shopowner' in his auctions), we first focus solely on the seller's reputation.
Reputation: BasicArgument
It is Straightforward to show how, at least in theory, reputation can h elp solving the trust problem. One could do with three assumptions:
1. a winning buyer always provides feedback on a seller's behavior after each completed auction;
2. a winning buyer always provides feedback honestly;
3. a seller's behavior is stable over time, in the sense that his past behavior is a strong predictor of his present behavior.
If a seller suc ceeds in auctioning a product he receives a r eputation rating as indicated by the first assumption. From the second assumption on e can con clude that a seller's reputation is an accurate overview of t h e b ehavior ofthat specific seller. The third assumption allows to ma ke infer ences of the kind "if this is a high reputation seller, it is likely that my trustwill be honored". Let us now examine to what extent these three assumptions are realistic. Judging from the high reputation scores and the large number of sellers with a (positive) reputa tion, it is certainly true that buyers (and sellers) provide feedback. However, Resnick and Zeckha user r eport that on eBay.com only a little more than 50 p e rcent of the buyers provide feedback and warn that it may be " ... dissatisfied customers [who] are substantially less likely to give feedback" (Resnick/Zeckhauser 2002, 3) . There are at least t wo reasons why it is harder to give n egative than positive feedback. First of all, giving negative feedback comes with a certain risk. A seller who is sanction ed by a buyer, could retaliate by giving n egative feedbacktothat buyer. In addition, by giving negative feedback a buyer admits that she h as been 'outsmarted' by a seller, which is to a certain degr ee loss of face for the buye r. The second assumption does n ot seem to b e r ealistic as well. Those who want to give negative feedback when positive feedback would h ave been appropriate can do so. Lee et al. have already p ointed out tha t the subjectivity of ratings can indeed lead t o unfairly low or high ratings, though others have argued that this is a minor issue "a large volume of accumulated information about a seller might converge to a certain point that represents the level of trustworthiness of the seller" (Lee et al. 2000, 4) . There is also a n incentive to provide positive feed back regardless of the b ehav ior of the other party. The r eason for this is t h at providing n egative feedback regarding a bad seller or buyer is a collective good. The n egative feedback is useful for othe rs who may want to en gage in future tra nsactions with the seller who cheated you, but comes at a potential cost to the one who gives it. One runs the risk of retaliation with negative comments, and could in fact be missing out on positive feedback one could have received in case of a positive review. The final assumption stated that a seller's behavior is stable over time, or at least an accurate assessment of a seller 's h onesty. As we a rgue later, the argument given by Lee et al. (2000) that the volume of accum ulated information converges to the true level of trustworthiness has a double edge. For a seller, the incentive to earn a positive rating decreases as his r eputation increases because one negative rating hardly affects a positive score of 1,000. Moreover, a seller might just be waiting and increasing his positive score in interactions of smaller value, only to deceive when stakes are high (in several fraud cases this seems to have been the strategy that was used) . In sum, one might expect that a seller's behavior will not deviate for long periods of time, but that especially high reputation sellers have incentives t o defect when the occasion presents itself.
Although the argument supporting an effect of reputation on sales is Straightforward and compelling ("higher reputation goes with more and better sales"), there are clear objections t hat raise doubts as to whether t h e conditions under which auctions are run actually support a useful implemen tation of t h is argument.
Will the real Reputation please rise ?
There are many ways in which on e could incorporate t he reputation score, and research ers h ave used differe nt ways to measure what they feel is the most adequate representation of the seller's 'real r ep utation' (whatever t h at may be). Some have used the total number of (unique) positive feedback, oth ers count only the (unique) negative feedback, and some use ratios such as t he percentage of all feedback tha t is positive. Given that there is a wide range of p ositive r eputa tion ratings-on eBay.com there are sellers with r eputation scores well over 1,000-it may be a good idea to transform the scores. Based on the plausible idea that the added value of an extra 'reputation point' d ecreases as r eputation inc reases, many researchers h ave considered not the repu tation score, but its logarithm (Ba/Pavlou 2002; Diekmann/ Wyder 2002; Resnick/Zeckhauser 2002; Houser/Wooders 2000) . Including the neutral comment s in creases the n um ber of ways to oper a tionalize reputation even more.
Moreover, on eBay a nd other large a uction sites the feedback profile does n ot only provide a n overview of all feedback ratings for a seller. It also provides an overview of feedback ratings separately for the last week, t h e last mont h, and the past six months. This allows users to subjectively value r a tings differen tly depending on the time it has b een since the ratings have been given. There are at least two arguments w hy information on the age of feedback ratings could influence the weight of each singular ra ting . First of all, b ecause people's behav ior might change over time, more recent past b eh avior could be a better predictor of n ear future behavior than less recent past b e havior. T h is would imply t h a t sellers with high positive feedback scor es would h ave a smaller ben efit from t h eir oldest feedback ratings t han from t h eir more r ecent feedback ratings (which ac-tually goes against the argument that the 50lst positive rating adds less than the 11th). Another implication ofthat idea would be that larger time gaps between feedback ratings have a negative effect on the infl.uence of feedback ratings itself. Related to that, one can imagine buyers are able to discern pat terns in a seller's behavior. For example, consider a seller with a feedback score of 8 7 consisting of 90 positives and 3 negatives, which is not too bad a score. Then if the negatives were collected in the three most recent transactions, this seems a reasonable indicator of 'a seller gone sour' and could infl.uence buyer behavior. Upfront we do not have very compelling thoughts as to which of the above is the best measurement, so we will treat this as an empirical question and get back to this issue when analyzing the data. We do note, however, t hat researcherB often pick one without much argumentation, which may have given rise to the inconsistent results across researchers.
Explaining Trust through Buyer and Product Characteristics
Basically, the elements of a sale on a n auction site are t he following: a buyer buys a product from a seller on a n auction site (through a product description). Logically, one can expect differences with regard to trust that relate to precisely these different emphasized elements. Some characteristics of buyers may affect probability of sale, some items are perhaps more easily sold, som e sellers are m ore likely to sell, and some auction sites might generate higher pr ices than others.
In this section we conside r thesesepara te eleme nts and review and elaborate on the arguments that may affect sales in online auctions.
Buyer Characteristics
Not all buyers have the same need for information to estimate the probability of a su ccessful sale. Although buyer characteristics are hardly mentioned in the literature, wh ether trust is placed does not solely depen d on t he t rustworthiness of the seller, but also on t he trustfulness (the degree to which a person is willing to trust) of the buyer (Snijders 1996) . When a buyer b ids at an auction site for the first time, she h as no exp erience, for instance, regarding t he effectiveness of the site's r eputa tion mechanism to keep fra udulent sellers out . As a buyer successfully engages in more auctions, past experie nces r educe the uncertaint y about the probability of a positive outcome. Therefore, a more experienced buyer (with positive experien ces) will have a smaller n eed t o redu ce uncer tainty through information from reputa tion and product description than a buyer who h as n o experiences. We therefore hypothesize that more experienced buyers are willing to pay highe r prices, a nd that effects of reputation and product description on sales are smaller for experienced buyers (with positive experiences) .
P roduct Characteristics
Part of the risk a buyer runs in online a u ctions is caused by t he charact erist ics of the product. As the buyer's trust proble rn increases, sh e will d ernand rnore safegua rds frorn a seller (cf. Snijders/ Buskens 2001) . In oth er word s, a b uyer's need for certainty increases as the risk of the transaction increases. A ssurning that reputation indeed reduces uncertainty a bout a seller's trustworthiness, then a buyer's derna nd for reputa tionwill increase as the level of risk involved in the purchase increases. We consider three characteristics of p rod ucts t hat influen ce the risk involved for the buye r: the v alue of a product, it's condition, a n d it's cornplexity. Pro duct value is the pr oduct cha r acteristic tha t is rnost often con t rolled for in previous resea rch. For insta n ce, in Eaton (2002) one of t he rnain r easons to ch oose Paul Reed Srnith Guita rs as the object of study was t he r elatively high price (typically over 1,000 U S Dollar), cornbined with the fact that t h is is a good with a quality tha t is difficult to assess. The rnonetary risk a buyer runs is higher for high value products than for low value p rod ucts. We t h erefore hypothesize that the effect of reputation on sales increases as p rodu ct value increases. A second p ro duct ch a racteristic t hat influen ces a b uyer's risk is wheth er the pr oduct is used or n ew. Ba and P avlou (2002) p oint ou t t h at for used or even for r efurbish ed products, "[ ... ] the quality varia n ce rnigh t increase significantly, w hich rneans the risk level for the buyer also increases" . Besides t h e obj ective varia nce in quality, subjec tive interpretation of t h e description of t h e qualit y rna tter s as well. For exarnple, the interpretation of a descr ipt ion 'in reasonable condition ' is a rnbiguous, wh ereas the description 'itern is unused' leaves no roorn for discussion. G iven tha t purch asing used products is rnore uncertain than p urch asing n ew product s, on e would exp ect r ep uta tion to h ave larger effects for used a nd r efurbish ed p rodu cts tha n for n ew pro ducts . T h ird, t h e cornplexity of the product is also likely to influence a bu yer 's risk. Cornplex produ cts leave rnor e opportunities for d efects tha t are hidden in the d escription, or can a t least b e rnore easily denied afterwards ( "I d id n ot k now t h a t option 23 in rnenu 4 did not work") . The uncertainty a b ou t the value of the good, a n d t h ereby t h e value of Rb , decr eases as the cornplexity of the product incr eases. We t h erefore hy pothesize t hat fo r cornplex pr oducts, t he effect of rep utation on sales sh ould b e larger.
The Combination of Seilerand Product: Product D escription s
The rnost basic inforrna tion t hat is d isplayed in (alrnost) all product descriptions in a uctions is a p roduct's bra n d narne and t ype. In fact, t h is is one way for the seller to convey q uality and function ality of the pr oduct. In a sirnila r context, Resnick a nd Zeckha user (2002) r efer rnor e gener ally t o standardizat ion as on e way of sign aling info rrnation. Besides brand a nd typ e, one can t r y to reduce the inherent trust p roblern by includ ing p ictures. As Eaton pu ts it "[t]o redu ce u ncertainty concerning t h e condition of a p roduct a seller can post p ictures of an item for sale" (Eaton 2002, 8) . It makes sense to distinguish b etween two types of pictures: pictures taken from some ca talogu e, and h ome m ade pictures. Sometimes sellers add pictures to their description t hat a re taken from the website of the original ma nufacturer (e.g., a picture of a Nokia phon e, as it appears on Nokia's website). Such pictures can give a good idea about wh at the product looks like in general and might be more useful t h an just referr ing to the product type, especially when the number of different p rodu cts w it h a similar type number is large (Nokia 5200, 3100, 3300) . Such a pictu re does not give any idea a b out the product 's actual condition, of course, wh ich is w hy it can make sense to include home made pictures (i. e., p ictures made b y the seller) as well. The pictures can likewise signal informa tion abou t t he seller when the picture reveals something unrelated to the product itself, but possibly related to characteristics of the seller. Adding home mad e pictures sh owing a phone in pristine state but in a really messy room might do the seller more harm than good. Although they may prove t o be very impor tant , differences between kinds of home made pictures are (empirically) beyond t he scope of this research. However, we do consider the difference between h ome mad e and catalogue pictures. In accordance w ith our earlier a rgu mentation we hyp othesize tha t adding a picture improves sales, and adding a hom e m ade picture h elps m ore than adding a catalogue picture (given tha t t he picture is of reasonable quality) . In addition, a nd in line with Ba a nd P avlou (2002) and the argu ment t hat a buyer's risk is highe r for used p roducts, we expect that t h e b en eficial effect of pictures is larger for used product s than for new products.
In the previous paragraph we already pointed out that for cert ain inform ation derived from the product description it is unclear wheth er the information concerns the product or the seller. For example, some sellers mention t hat the original packaging is included with the sale. In p rinciple, t h e packaging h as little or no value, but one could a rgue that a p e rson who keeps a product's original packaging is a p er son ta king more than average care in handling his products. The interpreta tion of such information is anyt hing but Straightforward a nd largely b eyond the scope of this paper. An interesting examp le is a selle r wh o indicates tha t a p roduct has b een slightly scr atched, t h ereby giving t h e impression tha t he is h onest by t elling t hat the product is n ot in mint condition , which imp licitly suggests that , besides the scratch that is men tioned, nothing is wrong wit h the product (or otherwise the seller would have told you) . Obviously, a t the heart of t his problern lies the fact that the product d escr iption is n ot provided by some outside objective source but by t h e seller of t h e good. This is in itself already problematic for t he buyer , since t h e seller is the person with w hom the buyer h as the trust problern to b egin with. In pr inciple, t h is implies tha t all hypothesized effects of cha racteristics of the pr oduct d escr iption are conditional on the buyer trusting the description. For this reason one cou ld expect that the effect of characte ristics of the product d escription a r e st ron ger for seller s w ith higher reputations. Unfort unately, it is just as easy to argue the opposite. For if a seller h as a low re putation score, reputation cannot be used to r educe the trust problem , a nd only product information can help t o redu ce it . If this argument is correct, ch a rac teristics of t he product description only have an effect when reputation scores are low, since these are t he only cases in which there still is a trust problern to solve. Since we see no p art icular reason to favor one or the other reasoning, we leave the effect of product description as an empirical issue.
Contextual Factors: Type of Auction and Site Characteristics
We n ow discuss some arguments rarely mentioned or m easured in t he liter atme that could partially explain mixed results found in previous research for the effects of reputation. The general argument is that a number of characteristics might h ave had an effect on sales, but h ave previously n ot always been controlled for. The first part of this section concentrates on a uction characteristics such as whether or not the seller uses a 'reserve price' (i.e. a minimum selling price), and how long the auction period lasts. The second part focuses on site ch aracterist ics such as the ratio of dema nd and supply for a good and a site's repu tat ion .
A uction-type Characteristics
Besides reputa tion and product informa tion som e resea r cher s claim that oth er a uction ch a racteristics also influence sales, or at least correlate with the prob ability of sale a nd the end price. Since most of these cha racteristics are gen erally not controlled for, they might also form a n explanation for t h e different fin dings with regard to t he effects of reputation as found in previous research. This subsection discusses five auction ch a racteristics tha t could affect sales.
The first a uction characteristic we consider are the available means of payment for a buyer. Eaton suggests t hat "[ ... ] escrow services may actually send a n egative sign al to prospective buyers [especially if] a seller has n egative feedback" (Eaton 2002, 18) . Diekmann and Wyder report that the h igher t he reput ation of a seller, the more likely that h e w ill d emand paym ent in advance (Diekma nn/Wyder 2002, 20) . Since payme nt in advance is mor e risky to a b uyer, t h is could have a negative impact on sales and thus obsc ure an effect of repu tation if it is not controlled for. The second and third characteristic are the bid in crement a nd the reserve price. Strictly sp eaking the size of the b id incr em ent sh ould not mat ter: everybody bids u p to his or h er maximum, a nd the only differen ce with larger bid increments would b e tha t b idding stops a b it soon er, which could lead to a somewhat lower price. Nevertheless Die kmann and Wyder find positive effects for bid increment on end price (and n o effects on probability of sale) . Perha ps there are oth er issues at st ake, such as the subjective idea t h at when bid increm ents a r e larger, you a re m ore likely to think t h at the good is valu able. Similar a r guments apply to the min imum bid a nd to (sometim es secret ) reserve p rices. Lower reserve prices at tract more potential b uyer s, thereby increasing the number of bidders. A fourth a nd p erhaps a som ewhat un derrated characteristic that could explain d iffere nces in r eputation effects are t h e shipmen t costs. In the (working) pap ers published up t o Ap ril 2004, the size of t h e effects of reputation on end price are no larger than a few percen t of t h e pr oduct's value (Melnik/ Alm 2002; Houser/ Wooders 2000; Eaton 2002; Dewan/ Hsu 2001) . In our study, shipment costs ranged between roughly eight and twenty US Dollars. Estimating the mean price of all completed auctions in t he r esearch on 200 US dollars, the difference between the highest and lowest shipment costs are about six percent of the mean auction price. This implies that, given t hat t he effects of reputation from previous research are rather small in size, forget ting to look for the shipment costs might prove a bigger mistake than forgetting to con sider the seller's reputation.
Finally, the auction duration could have an effect on the p robability of sale or on an auction's end price. The longer an auction lasts, the m oretime people have to notice the product and be interested, which increases the pr obability of sale and the end price. On the other hand, a longer auction likewise implies t h ere is a larger probability that p otential bidders find an attractive ot her item on offer, so that the net effect is not clear. There is some evidence t hou gh that most of the bidding occurs close to the end of the auction. An extreme example of this is the bidder strategy 'sniping' (Roth/ Ockenfels 2000) . The strategy comesdown to trying to squeeze in your bid as close to the auction deadline as possible to avoid other bidders from overbidding you and thus avoiding a price war amongst bidders. Roth a nd Ockenfels (2000) show that this strategy is used mor e often on eBay.com than on Amazon.com since Amazon uses a system with an open ending rule for the auction duration. (The auction does not close until a certain amount of time after the highest bid h as been placed.) Since m ost pr evious research has been conducted on eBay.com one might argue t h at this st rategy does not affect the mixed results found for r eputation effects. However, Roth and Ockenfels (2000) report that even within eBay.com there is a large differen ce between categories of products with respect to the prevalence of sniping.
Site Characteristics
Apa rt from auction characteristics, site characteristics can also influen ce t h e effect s of reputation on sales. Each a uction site con sists of a number of sections, for instance cars, real estate, electronics a nd art. Judging from the differences in the total number of a uctions, not all sections enjoy the same amou nt of activity. Differences in t he number of sellers and buyers w ithin a certain auction section inte rfer e with effects of r ep utation. First, demand for a n d supply of products is likely to influence sales, for obvious standa rd economic r easons . Some interference can also b e expected from differences in mean scor es of reputation across sites or across sections w ithin sites. For instance, on eBay.com a rep utation score of +50 is not bad, but a +50 on ePier.com is outstanding. T h ese differen ces are all hard to control for. M easuring d ema nd a nd supply for, say, a m obile phon e is h a rd to do, b ecause it is not clear wh a t the reference categor y is (all identical phones? all similar phones? all phones?) .
Reputation mechanisms differ across sites, and even within sites over time. Some mech anisms only m onitor n egative reputation, while others distinguish positive, n eutral a nd negative comments . A more subtle difference can b e found b etween the reputation m echanisms of ePier.com and eBay.com. While ePier.com gen erates a reputation scor e from t he total number of ratings, eBay.com only takes unique ratings into account (so that 10 p ositive feedback commen ts, all from person A to person B only count as + 1 for B) . Such d eviations in r eputation mechanisms and thus in the way reputa tion is calculated, m ay cause differences in re puta tion effects. Ev en if two sites h ave the same r eputation mechanism, effects of r eputation could differ per site because of other structural differences b etween sites. This becomes clear when one looks at t he way in wh ich auction sites advertise themselves in the 'about us'-sec tion (examp les below are taken from the sites in 2003).
For example, eBay.com clearly ma rkets their large number of members and auctions, trying t o convey that eBay.com is where the action is.
1 The Dutch QXL site, Rica rdo .nl, does n ot display any figures a bout t he number of auct ions, but refers to two t ests, one by a Dutch computer magazine, the ot her by an 'independent research burea u' using a 'research instrument d eveloped by the University of Amsterdam'. Both tests call Ricardo.nl t h e best Dutch auct ion site, although it is not clear what that mea ns. A som ewh a t d iffere nt a p proach is chosen by ePier.com. Apart from an 'about us'-section, t h ey have a special section called 'eBay vs ePier' . This section shows a price com parison for insertion a nd final value fees between eBay.com and ePie r. com. EPier.com d oes n ot ch arge insertion fees a nd charges lower final value fees than eBay.com for all item values (at least at the time of data collec tion) . E Pier.com is trying to position itself as the friendly alternative to eBay.com, perhaps hoping tha t users wit h a n ti-eBay sentiments organize themselves in ePier.com a nd m ake it flour ish. In a n y case, in principle this kind of marketing could lead to users identifying t h em selves with the a uction community. A stron g belief in the hon est y of oth er memb ers of an a uction site and a strong moral imperative to treat other communit y m embers h on estly could then make a reputation syste m superfluous. Table 1 provides an overview of our hypotheses.
Data and R eplications
We sta rt by trying to replicate the results of four earlier conducted research es, albeit based on newly collected data. Our choice of papers to a la r ge extent reflects the papers tha t were available to us at the start of our research; m eanwhile several oth er (working) p a p ers h ave been published (see Dellarocas 2003 for a recent overview). We ch ose t o try to re plicate Eaton (2002), Lee et al. (2000) , Ba a nd P avlou (2002), a nd Diekma nn and W yder (2002). Eaton (2002) a nalyzes t h e effect of reputation a nd product d escription on sales of Paul Reed S mith guita rs. Lee et al. (2000) focus on the effects of n egative feedback on t h e difference b etween retail and auction price for both n ew and used monitors a Possibly, interactions with reputation exist. An argument can b e made that these effects only surlace when reputation is high (because t his is t he only case when a picture can be trusted) or only when it is low (becau se this is the only case in which on e n eeds a picture to comp ensa t e for a lack of r eputation).
171 Table 1 : Other variables mentioned in the main text a revariables ab out wh ich w e do not have any sp ecific hypotheses.
and printers. Ba a nd Pavlou (2002) examine the effect s of feedback on wh at they call 'price premium' for 18 differ ent products, such as P okemon Gold cards , camcorders, music and software, a nd include (t he log of) positive and n egative feedback to study the effect of seller reputa tion on price prem ium. Diekmann and W yd er (2002) study the effects on sales of r eputation a nd d ifferen t auction characteristics, su ch as auction duration a nd bid increm ent. They use a u ctions of the Nokia 8310 from the Swiss QXL-site Ricardo.ch. Our d a ta has b een gathe red (by hand) from Novembe r 2002 until February 2003 from four different auction sites. Two au ction sites are Dutch: eBay.nl and Ricardo .nl. The other two a uction sites are US-based: eBay.com and ePier. com. The number of cases varies b etween t he four a u ction sites: 111 from eBay.nl, 125 from Ricardo.nl, 103 from eBay.com and 79 from ePier.com, addin g up to a total of 418 cases from 266 uniqu e selle rs. We ch ose to con sider a uctions of diffe rent t y p es of Nokia and M otorola m obile phon es. M obile ph on es are popular on a uction sites and although sta nda rdized products, t h ey have t he p ot ent ial to induce t rust problem s, given their vulner a bility a nd com plexity. Data were collected on b oth new and used phon es, but only data on phones in wor king condition h ave b een gathered. Also both simlocked and simlock free phones are in the data; sometimes accessories w ere included in the sale.
Besides 'standa rd' varia bles con cerning reputation, a u ction dura tion , number of bids, a nd number of pictures, we collected other possible intervening varia b les such as miscellaneous seller properties, characteristics of t h e p roduct descript ion and the means of payment. Table 2 gives an overview of the variables used in the four papers we try to replicate, and of our own data. Seller reputation (when defined as number of unique p osit ive feedback comments minus number of unique negative feedback comments) in our data is as follows: -1 (3 sellers), zero (88 sellers) , + 1 (19 sellers), +2 (20 sellers), and a ma.ximum reputa tion score of + 1032 (1 seller). The mean of t h e seller reputa tion is 58. Reputation scores differ between auctions sites, as can be seen in Table 3 . EBay.com is by far the site w ith the largest reputation scores a nd ePier. com by far the site with the lowest. A picture is included in 80% of the auct ions; a h ome made picture is included in 25% of the a u ctions. The buyer's a re gen erally a b it less experien ced t h an t h e seller s: 2 buyers with a reputation of -2, three w ith -1 , 92 wit h zer o, and a mean of ab out + 13. Our auctions end in a sale in 51% of the cases, w it h prices ran ging from about 10-25 Euro for the oldest a nd cra ppiest phones up to 500-900 Euro for the most expensive m od els .
First a few gen eral rem a rks on the process of r eplica t ion. We h ave tried to copy the r esearch m ethod s of each p a p er as much as p ossible. To keep mat ter s tracta b le, we tried to rep licate at most t wo analyses from each paper, the ones that we thought wer e at the hea rt of the issu e in t he p a rtic ular pap er . Space constraints do not allow us to disc uss the sep a rate rep lications in detail, but a d etailed account of the way in w hich the rep lica tions were run can b e foun d in Zijdeman (2003) . Her ewe summa rize our rep lication r esu lts. The first t h ing to n ot e is that the r esu lts from our rep lication vary conside ra bly from the original results, a nd it seems unlikely t o us tha t all d iffere nces can be attributed to diffe ren ces in the way in which we p erformed the rep lications. A su mm ary of the findings of the rep lication of prev ious r esults is shown in Table 4 .
These meager results show that t h e r esults on the effec t of reputation a renot only differe nt across pap ers, but also ac ross r eplications. App arent ly, there is st ill much to b e learned her e. Som e remarks on the most consp icu ous r eplication results a r e in order. First, in som e analyses on the pr obability of sale, seller reputa tion h as a negative sign. In the re plica tion of Ba and Pavlou this n egative Table 4 Observations from: Ebay .com only All Sits
Chris Snijders/ Richard Zijdeman
Overview of the number of successfully replicated effects, compared to the total nurober of effects aimed to replicate (hence, 2:4 means "2 out of 4 repli cat ed") .
Probability of Sale
End effect of reputation is even significant. It seems quite u nlikely t hat the perceived trustworthiness of the seller decreases with increasing reputation. One possible expla nation for this finding is that as a seller's reputation increases, h is auction b ehavior changes in a way that has a negative influence on t he probability of sale, and there is some evidence for this in the d ata. For instance, sellers wit h high reputation scores are mor e often 'power sellers', who steadily offer t h eir good s on sale for relatively high prices, in t he expectation t h at in t he end someone will buy at this higher level. A related argument is that sellers with high r eputation scor es could be t rying to receive higher prices as a b onus for their perceived trustworthiness. In any case, this is som ething to reckon w it h in t h e exten ded a nalyses on our data below. A second interesting finding is tha t the effects of reputation on an a u ction 's end price are so diverse. For instance, Ba a nd Pavlou found a significan t positive effect for n egative rep utation (!) on end price, but we could not replicate this result. A likely reason for this positive effect is that t here is a high corr elat ion between positive and negative feedback (in our data 0.85) . P ositive and n egative feedback ca n the n hardly be distinguished and m ay actually both measure something like 'eBay experience'.
Analyses on the Mobile Phon e Data
In the analyses of our m obile phone data we intend to test our hypotheses, as weil as control for possible effects of additional varia bles t h at we collected. F irst we turn to our measurement of reputation.
Reputation
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) report three ways in which reputation has been mo deled in previous research. As we m entioned before, in some papers on ly negative feedback is used to represent a seller 's reputation. In other pap ers the feedback rating or the 'net score' (positive feedback minus negative feedback, most of the times based on only the unique comments) is used as an indicator for a seller's reputation. Finally, in several papers the logarit hm of feedback or the logarithms of positive a nd n egative feedback are used t o operationalize seller reputation. When compa ring the results of previous r esear ch the question arises to wh a t degree these m easurements of reputation correspond. Table 5 shows the correlations in our data betwee n the measurem ents of r eput ation based on observations from all four auct ion sites. T he ta ble shows t hat correlations b etween d iffer ent ways of operation alizing r eput at ion a r e high. When we use t he observations from each auction sit e sep a ra tely, t he corr elation mat rices b ased on the observations of eBay.com and eBay.nl show simila r results, and the correlation matrix based on observa tions from eP ier.com even shows somewhat high er correlation coefficients. Besides the total number of p ositive, neutral a nd n egative feedb ack, t h e four auction sites also provide in forma tion on t h e number of feedbacks received in the last week, t h e last month (4 weeks on ePier. com) and t he last 6 m onths. A compa rison of t hese nu mbers could, in princip le, give som e insight into wheth er the effects of m ore r ecent feedback d iffer fro m the effects of less recent feedback. Again the stron g correlations preve nt su ch conclusions. First of all, 'feedback in t h e last month' is n ecessar ily correla ted w ith 'feed back in t he last 6 m onths' , simply b ecause one is a su bset of the ot h er. We t h erefore su bt ract ed t h e feedback from the last week fro m t h e feedback from t h e last mont h. A similar pr ocedure was used for the feed back from the last m onth a nd the last h alf year, to get separ ate measures for feedback in the last week, the three weeks b efore t h at, and t h e five months b efore that . Even then the cor rela tions remain strong, and using logarithms or compa ring negat ive a nd p osit ive feedback does not make t hese stron g correlations disappear. The sm allest correla tion coefficien t we found was bet ween positive a nd n egative feedback in t h e last week (r=0 .375); m ost oth er correla tions b etween different ways of measurin g r eputation are above 0 .75. Thou gh previous pap er s h ave op er ationalized reputation in various ways, our d ata sh ow stron g correlation s b et ween differ ent m easuremen ts of repu tation . O n the on e h a nd this suggests tha t the differ ent ways of op erationalizing r eputation a re n ot likely to b e the r eason for t h e different results in diffe rent p a p er s. O n t h e other hand this finding is pr oblem a tic b ecause it m a kes it h ard t o d isentangle precisely what drives the effects of reputation on sales. In our analyses we chose to use the reputation score as used by eBay.com, the number of u nique p ositive feedback items minus the number of unique negative feedback items.
Characteristics of Buyer, Product, and Seller
The only buyer characteristic in the analyses is the reputation rating of the winning buyer, as a measure of buyer experience. We hy p othesized that m ore experienced buyers (with positive experiences) perceive a smaller r isk -for instance because over time they start to believe that the a uction syst em actually works-and are therefore willing to pay higher prices, as compared to buyers with less experience. Another argument, with opposite implica tions, is t hat with experience buyers learn to better evaluate what is a b a rgain a nd what n ot. This would instead suggest that 'rookie buyers' are more likely to over pay than seasoned eBay professionals.
We also argued that there may be a difference between p ictures copied from a website and home made pictures. The number of catalogue pict ur es includ ed in an auction ranges from one to seven, except for a single outlier w ith 14 pictures. The number of home made pictures included in an auction r anges from on e to six, except for two outliers from a single seller with 18 home mad e pictures. Aft er rem oving the outliers t he t otal number of pictures correlates almost equally with the number of ca t alogue pictures a nd the number of hom e mad e pict u res, b ot h 0.65. There is a small n egative correlation, -0.13, b et ween t he numb er of inte rnet pictures and h ome made pictures. We use both variables in t h e analyses.
Our Ta ble 2 showed a number of va ria bles r epresenting elem ents in the produ ct description. For example, whether the color of the phon e was given and w h ether a nmction d escription of the phon e was given. Althou gh we controlled for all of these variables in various analyses, few of t h em t urned ou t to influen ce sales, only < function d escription included > a nd <original p ackaging included > sometimes did. The refor e, only these two have b een includ ed in the a n alyses as controls. We sta rt our analyses w ith a base m od el including seller r eputation, the number of unique p ositive feedback items m inus the numb er of uniqu e n egative feedback items, to m easure reputation. W ith r espect to the product d escription we sta rt with wh ether or n ot one or mor e pict ures were included ( < picture (dummy) > ) , the total number of p ictures ( < pictures (numbe r) > ) , a nd w hether home made pictures wer e included ( <hom e mad e pictures (dummy) > ). Buyer exp erience was m easured wit h t he buyer's r epu tat ion score ( < buyer experience> ). W e also include w hether a good was used ( < used > ) a nd w hether the good was in a good condition ( <good con dition> ) , r anging on a five-p oint scale from poor ('1 ') to n ew ('5'). The complexity of goods, wh ich we hy p othesized t o h ave an effect on the effect of r eputation on sales, har dly var ies in our d a ta so we do n ot include it. We also control for t h e fo ur differ ent kind s of a uctions (eBay.com , eBay.nl, ePier. com , a nd Ricardo.ch ), for t he d ifferen t t ypes of phones, a nd for the date (a t t h e end of the a uction), because prices of m obile phones d ecr ease over time. More ela b orate mo dels include several varia bles r ela ted to the ch a r acteristics of the a u ction itself su ch as m eans of p ayment , kinds of bid incr ements, shipment cost s, etc.
Explaining the Probability of Sale
There is dustering in the data, because some of the auctions are fr om the same sellers. We therefore correct the standard errors of our logistic regression model based on Huber's procedure for dustered data (Huber 1981, as implemented in Stata) . The base model with all observations shows a significant negative effect of seller reputation but the coefficient is very small: 10 extra reputat ion points lead to an decrease in the probability of sale of 0.5 per centage p oints. We think this negative effect largely arises because of high volume sellers using a strategy affering goods against relatively high reserve prices. If we indude a dummyvariable measuring whether the reputation score is larger than 50, then this variable has a substantial and significant negative effect (-1. 06, p=0.035), the difference is more than 20 percentage points, which indeed corroborates the idea that high reputation sellers ('power sellers') tend t obe m ore willing t o wait until a buyer with a high need for the good comes along. It does not h elp much if a seller offers a headset or some other accessory, as can be seen from t he absence of an effect of the number of items for sale. Induding a picture h elps (a bout a 20 percentage points increase if you have one included), and t h ere is some indication tha t induding more pictures increases the p robab ility of sale fur t h er (p= 0.06), but whether or not pictures a re home made does not seem to matter. Moreover, whether the phone was used or new also has no effect. Compared to eBay.com the probability of selling a phone on any of t h e oth er a uction sites is significantly lower. We find that during our data collection p erio d, phones sell less well as time progresses. Note that we did n ot indude the buyer r eputation in this model.
If we add the interaction of reputation w ith the site dummies, we find t h at the effects of r eputation differ across auction sites, though the differences are n ot that large. Only on ePier.com t he effect of r eput ation is positive (but n ot significantly different from zero) It is important to r ealize that sellers' r ep utation scores a re high er on eBay.com than on the other sites. If we confine the analysis t o the cases where reputation scores a re smaller t han 75, t he differences b et ween sites disappear. When we indude the interactions of reputation wit h other variables, we find only one inte raction effect of reputation that t urns ou t to have a statistically significant effect: the p ositive effect of a picture increases with increasing reputation (or: the positive effect of r eputation increases when a picture is present). For some other variables we have relatively large numbers of missing values (for instance for shipment costs and condition of item). Separate a nalyses show tha t n either of these show a significant relationsh ip wit h probability of sale.
E xplaining End Price
Next we consider the analyses on end price, using the same independent variables as in the previous a nalysis on probability of sale. The only exception is tha t we can now also indude buyer r eputa tion, as a measure for a buye r's exp e rience in a u ction s. Obviously, we only conside r auctions where the p hone was eventually sold. As in the previous a nalyses, we cont rol for t he differe nt Table 6 Logit regression on whether a p hone was sold. t ypes of phones in t he data. Closer inspection of t he data shows that one of the assum ptions of standard regression mo dels, homosced asticity, does not hold in ou r data. Loosely translated, the assump tion t hat is violated in our data is that the regr ession line should fit about equally weil for different values of the independent variables. For instance, we find that the mod el pr ed icts much better for t he cases where t he seller has high r eputation. We t herefore estimate a mo del assuming multiplicative het erosced asticity as in Harvey (1976) . 2 T hough t his may ap pear to be a m ere technicality, t he results will show that precisely t his issue, using standard regr ession models where t his is not appropriate, is an important one.
The basic idea of t his alternative estimation metho d is t hat in the regression analyses one includes not only the predict ors for the mean value of t hedependent variable, b ut also predictors for its variance. T he technical details are as follows. where it is reasonable to assume that the heteroscedasticit y varies smoot h ly with predictors g.
In our case the heteroscedasticity problern arises a t least to some extent because the model fits better for less expensive phones. This is n ot so strange: it is easier to predict selling prices for phones of 100 dollars than it is to predict prices of phones of 500 dollars, simply because there is more room for error around 500 (taking the log of end price as the dependent variable d oes n ot solve this issue). In our base model, we also include the rep utation score in the prediction of the variance in the residuals (the variable z 1 then equals the seller's reputation score) and whether a product was used (the variable z2 equals whet her or not a product was used). The disadvantage is that we are now no longer able to control for dustering at the seller level, but given that the differences between the results with and without this option in previous analyses seem rather small, we will take that for granted. Table 7 shows the results of our analyses. Table 7 Regression of end price, a.ssuming multiplicative h eterosceda.sticity. In our b ase model, we now find that ther e is a positive effect of r eputation on end price. This is all the more noteworthy because w ithout controlling for heteroscedasticity we do not find such an effect. On average, every 10 additional reputation points yield an extra 60 dollar cents. P eople attending our presentation in Bielefeld at the Trust and community on the Internet conferen ce of August 2003 might remember that we did n ot control for h eteroscedasticity in the analyses we presented there and subsequently concluded-wrongly, as it turns out-that no effect of reputation exists. In fact, in n on e of t he papers we considered in which no effect of reputationwas found, heter oscedasticity is given any serious attention. For Diekma nn and Wyder (2002) the issue is n ot likely to play a role, since they consider only one specific (new) phone a n d t h erefore a rela tively homogenous set of end prices, and in fact t h ey do find a n effect of reputation (comparable in size). Reputation also plays a role in the varian ce component. It turns out that the variance in the residuals d ecr eases with increasing reputation scores (controlling for the other indepen dent variables, t hat is). This is again an indication that auctions from 'power sellers' a r e d ifferent from auctions of others. The image that pops up on the basis of our r esults is that the power sellers do not mind putting their goods up for auction as often as is necessary to get their wanted price, and that eventually t h eir goods are indeed sold for around these prices. If we include the square of r ep utation in t h e predictors for the residuals, we get a significant quadratic effect of r eputation w ith a maximum around reputation score 290. Besides the effect of r eputat ion on the residuals, we also find the expected positive effect of the mean of end price (a=0.028, z=4.63): variance in the residuals increases with price. The other independent variables show the following r esu lts. Includ ing a picture increases t he value w ith on average 26 dollars, but adding m ore pictures does n ot h elp, a nd whether the p ictures include home made on es is also irrelevant. Adding a function description increases the value with 30 dollars (p= 0 .003), and when a phoneis n ot n ew this decreases the end price with on average 59 d ollars. Prices on Ricard o.nl are lowest (an average differen ce of 50 dollars), followed by eBay.nl (21 dolla r lower end prices). eBay.com and ePier.com have t he h ighest end p rices, with a sta tistically not significant edge for ePier.com of 27 dolla r s.
Whe n we add interactions of reputation w ith site dummies, we find t hat t h e p osit ive effect of reputa tion is la rgely due t o t he eBay.com cases. For ePier.com a nd eBay.nl the net effect of r ep uta tion is even slightly n egative. This is a n oth er reason to b e cautious about gene ralizing the usual eBay.com results . Adding oth er interactions of reput ation shows small effects: t h e effect of reput ation slightly decr eases wh en pictures are used , a nd the effect of reputation sligh tly inc reases w hen used goods are considered. Several variables hardly ever app roached significan ce or had too many missing values to run m ean ingful analyses and a re not included in t he analyses we present h ere: the interact ion of seller reputation with buyer r eputation, the means of payment, the size of t h e b id increment, reserve price, and shipment costs.
Whe n we compare t h ese results with our hypoth eses, we see t hat t h e following hypot h esized effects are supported by the d a ta: the probability of sale increases w ith t h e inclusion of a picture and more pictures is bet t er, and the probabilit y of sale varies across auction sites. The end price is higher when the seller has a higher reputation, when a picture is included, when a function description is included, and when the item is new. Hardly any of the hypothesized interaction effects with reputation emerged.
Summary and Conclusion
The general aim of this paper was to gain some insight into the mixed result s found in previous research on the effects of reputation in online auctions. First we summarized and extended the arguments in previous papers on reputat ion effects, using the Trust Game as a metaphor for online interaction. We t hen t r ied to replicate four recent papers using data gathered from four different auction sites and also analyzed this data somewhat more extensively using t he additional variables we collected.
The results of the replications are rather different from the original resu lts, not only with respect to the effects of reputation. The only replica tion t hat seems to work out well is that of the analyses by Eaton (2002) , although also ther e not all results match. We considered several r easons for these differ ences, but n on e of these seem completely satisfactory. The first p ossible reason for differences betwee n the paperswas that there are considerable differ ences as to which variables are included in the analyses. This is why we took the t rouble to collect (almost) all variables as used in these papers, plus a large set of p ot entially useful others. Moreover, the papers differed in the wa y in which r eputat ion was operationalized. Our analyses sh ow that neither of these possible r easons for differences b etween papers can explain away the differen ces completely. Esp ecially the different reputation measures are so highly correlated t hat it does not seem to m atte r much which measurem ent of reputation one takes. Anot h er potential reason for differ ences is tha t the products under study var ied across pap ers. In particular whether goods are used versus new , or standard ver sus complex, might b e of influe nce. For this we also do n ot find much corroboration in our data. However, we do find str ong evidence suggesting t h at in previous pap ers some problems may h ave gone unnoticed with respect to heteroscedasticity in the data (when considering the e nd price). When a nalyzed with ordinary least squares techniques, which implies ignoring the h eteroscedasticit y, our d ata show no effect of reputation on end price, just as most of the other auction pap ers do. When w e d o control for he teroscedasticity, we find a positive and significant, albeit small, effect of reputation. To replicat e this result we collec ted an additional set of auction data, consisting of 1152 eBay.com auctions of five kinds of Ipo d mp3-players (only e nd price, reputation, and a few p rod uct characteristics were collect ed). In these d a ta we indeed found similar results: end price significantly incr eases with reputa tion, but this is fou nd on ly when one controls for h eteroscedasticity in the data; oth erwise one finds n o effect .
Hen ce, with r espect to our original hypotheses we can say t h at t here is some eviden ce in our data t hat r eputation h elps sales, in thesensethat it may get you a high er price. A high r eputation does n ot h elp to get t h e goods sold. For t his latte r finding there is in fact a nother explanation , namely that h igh r eputat ion sellers tend to sell only for higher prices (through establishing a h igh minimum price). Some additional corroboration for this explanation comes from t he fact that the variance in end price is smaller for sellers with a high reputation. We also found some variables that have thus far not often been included in t he a n alyses. Adding a picture to the product description helps: goods are sold m ore often and sold goods sell for higher prices when a picture is included. We find no evidence of extra benefits from the picture being h ome mad e. Moreover, there is evidence of higher end prices when a function d esr ipt ion of t he product is included. No differences b etween experienced and inexperienced buyer s are found. The experienced buyers neither buy at lower pr ices (there is som e evidence of this in the data, but n ot significantly so) nor do t hey value t h e effect of reputation differently than less experienced buyers. W her eas it d oes n ot m att er whether a good is used or new for the probability of sale, used goods obviously sell at lower prices. The variance in end prices is larger for used goods t han for new ones.
We have only scratched the surface of what could b e going on on auction sites and it certainly is a surprising finding that both m od el r eplication as well as deduction of hypotheses t hat can stand a comparison with t h e data is so difficult. Especially since predictions in a uction research should b e where social scien ce excels: v irtually all the information tha t is known t o t h e user of an auction site is available to the researcher, making it a setup u nder quasi-experimental conditions. Certainly auctions should b e easier to analyze than t opics w h ere the only data on e can use are based on field studies in noisy cir cumstances, as so oft en is the case. Appa rently, it is not so simple. We conclude with some suggestions for research ers w ho w ish to analyze auction and r eputation data. First , include other varia bles b esides sale, end pr ice, and reputation in your da t a collection. Especially wh ethe r pictures a r e included and wh eth er a function description is included h as a n impact, but so might oth er variables. At this point we are still not sure e nough about w hich issues matter m ost , and addition al empirical evidence is n ecessary to get some guidance with respect to theory d evelopment. Second, be sure to conside r the different ways in wh ich reputa tion can be opera tion alized a nd check for large correlations b et ween t h em.
For instance, what you t hink is an effect of n egative r eputation could be an effect of positive reputation (given that these te nd to correlate strongly). Third, think carefully a b out w hether you want to a nalyze auctions of different goods simultan eously. There is evidence that this leads to h et eroscedasticity, which in turn can produce inad equ a te results w hen analyzed with standard regression a nalyses. You sh ould ch eck for h eteroscedasticity in any case, since there is eviden ce that other independent varia bles, such as the r eputation score of t h e seller , correla te with the fit of the model. Fourth, think about analyzing the data, or perhaps ev en d esigning theory, separately for the occasional user and the professional user of an a uction site. Ther e is strong evidence that both groups sh ow different b ehavior. Finally, some extra att ention should be paid to the diffe ren ces with respect to the auction sit es themselves. Although we do not h ave enough data to make strong claims here, t he re are differences t hat are worthy of further investigation. Probability of sale and end prices d iffer b etween
